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Highlights 
 ALE and MACM meta-analytic techniques were used to integrate results from  
144 ToM fMRI datasets 
 Contrast analyses were used to look at differences between specific ToM tasks, 
as well as broader task parameters 
 For each contrast, common as well as distinct patterns of neural activation were 
identified 
 MACM also identified distinct functional networks for different ToM 
parameters 
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ABSTRACT 
Theory of mind (ToM) is an important skill that refers broadly to the capacity to 
understand the mental states of others. A large number of neuroimaging studies have 
focused on identifying the functional brain regions involved in ToM, but many 
important questions remain with respect to the neural networks implicated in specific 
types of ToM task. In the present study, we conducted a series of activation likelihood 
estimation (ALE) meta-analyses on 144 datasets (involving 3150 participants) to 
address these questions. The ALE results revealed common regions shared across all 
ToM tasks and broader task parameters, but also some important dissociations. In terms 
of commonalities, consistent activation was identified in the medial prefrontal cortex 
and bilateral temporoparietal junction. On the other hand, ALE contrast analyses on our 
dataset, as well as meta-analytic connectivity modelling (MACM) analyses on the 
BrainMap database, indicated that different types of ToM tasks reliably elicit activity in 
unique brain areas. Our findings provide the most accurate picture to date of the neural 
networks that underpin ToM function. 
 
Keywords: Theory of Mind; fMRI; activation likelihood estimation; medial prefrontal 
cortex; temporoparietal junction; meta-analytic connectivity modelling. 
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1. Introduction 
A critical skill in everyday life is the ability to decode and react appropriately to social 
signals from other people, including cues to their mental states. Theory of Mind (ToM) 
refers broadly to our capacity to understand others’ mental states, and to appreciate that 
these may differ from our own (Gallagher and Frith, 2003). ToM difficulties are a key 
predictor of social function outcomes, mental health and quality of life (Milders et al., 
2003), and are a prominent feature in many clinical populations (Baron-Cohen, 2000; 
Brüne, 2005; Henry et al., 2006, 2009;  Martín-Rodríguez & León-Carrión, 2010; 
Monetta et al., 2009). Given the critical role this type of social understanding plays in 
our everyday lives, it is not surprising that the capacity to make ToM judgements has 
been a major topic of investigation in cognitive science (Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs, 2006; 
Frith & Frith, 2012).  
In the neuroimaging literature, a large number of studies have been conducted to 
isolate the underlying neural substrates of ToM. It has been argued that a core 
mentalizing system that involves the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), precuneus, and 
bilateral temporoparietal junction (TPJ) is critical when considering the mental states of 
others (Carrington & Bailey, 2009; Frith & Frith, 2006). However, ToM processing has 
also been shown to involve neural activation in regions not associated with this 
network, such as the amygdala, superior temporal sulcus (STS), posterior and anterior 
cingulate cortex (PCC, ACC), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and the temporal poles 
(Amodio & Frith, 2006; Lieberman, 2007; Siegal & Varley, 2002).  
 Several meta-analyses, in which all imaging studies with keywords such as 
‘theory of mind’ are statistically aggregated, have been conducted to try and resolve 
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inconsistencies in the literature. A limitation of this approach is that potentially 
meaningful differences can be obscured. Indeed, the need to avoid mixing ‘apples and 
oranges’ has long been recognised as an important concern in meta-analytic 
methodology (see, e.g., pioneering work by Glass, 1976), and has particular relevance 
in relation to a complex, multifaceted construct such as ToM.  
Two recent meta-analyses have used a more nuanced approach, and focused on 
whether there might be specific ToM task-related differences in patterns of neural 
activation. In one, Van Overwalle (2009) performed a region-of-interest (ROI) based 
meta-analysis on many aspects of social cognition, including ToM. A limitation of Van 
Overwalle’s (2009) study, however, was that the findings were necessarily restricted to 
the a priori defined ROIs.  Schurz et al. (2014) therefore used a different approach that 
allowed them to look at local differences in greater detail. Specifically, a whole-brain 
meta-analysis on a voxel-by-voxel basis was conducted. They found that different ToM 
tasks activated common brain areas in the mPFC and the bilateral posterior TPJ, but that 
particular sub-areas of the ToM network were preferentially engaged by some tasks and 
not others. Specifically, areas in the TPJ, mPFC, the precuneus, the temporal lobes and 
the inferior frontal gyri all showed distinct profiles of task-related activation. These 
results support the concept of a core network for ToM that generalises across different 
types of task (i.e., a core mentalizing system), as well as additional areas responsible for 
specific types of ToM reasoning.  
Although the study of Schurz et al. (2014) is an important step forward in 
understanding the neural networks involved in ToM functions, several critical questions 
remain. In particular, in addition to distinguishing between specific task-types, 
individual fMRI studies highlight potentially important differences across broader ToM 
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task parameters. In particular, instructional focus (whether participants are asked to 
provide implicit or explicit ToM judgements; e.g., Kestemont et al., 2013), type of 
mentalising inference (cognitive versus affective; e.g., Bodden et al., 2013), and 
modality of presentation (whether the task is presented visually or verbally; e.g, 
Gallagher et al., 2000) have all been argued to be potentially important distinctions. The 
goal of the present study was to extend the work of Schurz et al. (2014) by investigating 
patterns of shared and distinct brain activation in response to specific types of ToM 
tasks.   
The role of instructional cues  
Recent theoretical developments suggest that ToM is subserved by two systems. 
One operates implicitly, develops early, is independent of the development of language 
and executive functions, and is responsible for efficient monitoring of “belief-like” 
states. The other system is explicit, develops later and depends on domain-general 
cognitive resources such as executive control. These two putative ToM systems have 
also been labelled ‘lower-level’ and ‘higher-level’ (Apperly, 2010; Frith & Frith, 2008), 
‘spontaneous’ and ‘intentional’ (Kestemont et al., 2013; Ma et al., 2012), ‘automatic’ 
and ‘controlled’ (Satpute & Lieberman, 2006), and ‘Type One’ and ‘Type Two’ (Bohl 
& van den Bos, 2012).  
Some dual-process theorists argue that implicit and explicit processes are 
subserved by distinct neural networks. Specifically, the explicit or reflective system is 
argued to rely upon lateral prefrontal cortex, lateral parietal cortex, mPFC, rostral ACC 
and the medial temporal lobe region. By contrast, the implicit or reflexive system is 
thought to include the amygdala, basal ganglia, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, dorsal 
ACC and lateral temporal cortex (Satpute & Lieberman, 2006; Lieberman, 2007). An 
7 
 
opposing view is that both types of ToM function are subserved by similar neural 
regions, particularly the mPFC and TPJ (Van Overwalle & Vandekerckhove, 2013). 
Direct neuroimaging evidence for each of these views is surprisingly limited, 
with most ToM studies to date only providing participants with explicit mentalizing 
instructions. In one of the few fMRI studies to compare implicit and explicit 
instructional cues, Kestemont et al. (2013) found common activation in the posterior 
STS, TPJ and precuneus. However, the mPFC was uniquely activated when implicit 
instructions were provided, suggesting that there may also be important differences in 
the neural networks underlying explicit and implicit ToM systems.  
Several other studies have also pointed to potentially important differences 
between the two putative ToM systems. Several of these have used variants of Heider 
and Simmel’s (1944) classic animations. Here, participants are asked to describe the 
motion of geometric shapes based on simple animations. While these animations were 
originally designed to index causal attribution, participants often spontaneously recruit 
mental states to describe the shapes’ behaviour. For example, Gobbini et al. (2007) used 
both an implicit geometric shape ToM task and an explicit false belief ToM task. The 
false belief task elicited unique activity in the ACC, PCC and TPJ, whereas the implicit 
task elicited activity along the full length of the STS and within the frontal operculum 
(Gobbini et al., 2007). It is noteworthy that these brain regions differ from those 
identified as unique to implicit ToM in the study of Kestemont et al. (2013). To date, 
therefore there is no consensus as to whether implicit and explicit mentalizing are 
subserved by common or distinct brain areas. The present study employed a meta-
analytic approach to address this issue. 
Role of different types of mentalising inference 
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Whereas “hot” or affective ToM requires an understanding of others’ emotions 
or feelings, “cold” or cognitive ToM requires an understanding of their beliefs, thoughts 
or intentions (Brothers & Ring, 1992). Most neuroimaging studies have assessed 
affective ToM either by presenting pictorial stimuli depicting complex affective states, 
or by using verbal narratives that describe a protagonist’s emotional state. In contrast, 
cognitive ToM has most often been assessed by asking participants to complete tasks 
that require processing of cues to sarcasm, deception, white lies or social faux pas, as 
well as via false-belief paradigms that require understanding that others may hold 
beliefs about the world which differ from one’s own beliefs, as well as from reality 
(Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Prior discrepancies in the neuroimaging literature might 
therefore reflect differences in the functional networks involved in these two types of 
ToM.  
In one recent study (Bodden et al., 2013), direct comparisons of neural 
activation associated with an affective minus cognitive condition identified greater 
activity in the right TPJ, left supplementary motor area, and right ACC. However, 
cognitive ToM did not recruit any additional unique activation clusters. This might 
indicate that affective and cognitive ToM share common neural correlates, but that the 
former also imposes demands on additional, specific brain areas (perhaps linked to basic 
emotion recognition; see e.g., Mier et al., 2010). Other studies have suggested that 
cognitive ToM also imposes demands on additional, unique areas. For instance, in one 
study, a cognitive perspective-taking task led to greater activation in the right anterior 
IFG, left frontomarginal gyrus and right frontopolar gyrus, whereas the reverse contrast 
yielded increased activation in the medial orbitofrontal cortex (Hynes et al., 2006).  
Taken together, while previous comparisons of affective and cognitive ToM clearly 
9 
 
point to there being substantial areas of shared neural activation, they differ with respect 
to the degree to which they each impose demands on additional areas. Using ALE meta-
analyses, we aimed to provide the clearest evidence to date concerning the underlying 
functional networks involved in different types of ToM function.  
The role of stimulus modality. 
Most fMRI studies of ToM to date have involved participants looking at visual 
stimuli during scanning. However, some visual tasks do not include any narrative (for 
instance, ToM cartoons, silent videos and photographs), whereas others impose 
substantial demands on verbal abilities (such as ToM stories). For example, Kobayashi 
et al. (2007) found increased activation in the anterior STS and temporal pole during a 
ToM story relative to a non-verbal ToM cartoon. It was suggested that this increased 
activity in the temporal cortex reflected increased verbal demands in the story task, 
based on evidence implicating these regions in language processing. However, as with 
the distinction between explicit and implicit ToM instructions, and between cognitive 
and affective ToM, at the individual study level there are typically many potential 
differences between tasks that might explain differences in functional activity. Using 
quantitative meta-analysis, our aim in the present study was to provide a clearer 
understanding of the shared and distinct neural networks associated with each of these 
different task parameters.   
Meta-analytic connectivity modelling 
While the regions argued to underlie different aspects of ToM are collectively 
referred to as a mentalizing ‘system’, little research has been conducted on how they 
interact with each other or with other brain areas. In the absence of such information, it 
is difficult to construct a coherent explanation of our capacity to read the minds of 
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others (Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013). An additional aim of the current investigation was 
therefore to use advanced meta-analytic connectivity modelling (MACM) with the data 
available in the BrainMap database to characterise and compare the connectivity 
patterns of brain regions involved in different ToM components for the first time. This 
approach can be used to establish data-driven functional connectivity maps for specific 
brain areas by exploiting neuroimaging databases such as BrainMap to identify patterns 
of co-activation across thousands of studies (Robinson et al., 2010).  
The present study 
Based upon earlier empirical and meta-analytic reviews (Bzdok et al., 2012; 
Schurz et al., 2014; Van Overwalle, 2009), we predicted that the mPFC, precuneus and 
bilateral TPJ should be reliably engaged by tasks designed to elicit ToM. It is less clear 
to what extent specific types of ToM task and broader ToM task-parameters are 
associated with unique functional activity, or how different brain regions involved in 
ToM interact. To address these questions, we conducted a series of co-ordinate-based 
meta-analyses using activation likelihood estimation (ALE; Eickhoff et al., 2009). Our 
first aim was to establish which brain areas are consistently engaged in ToM functions 
by conducting an ALE meta-analysis across all relevant studies. We then identified 
seven distinct types of ToM task, and conducted separate ALE meta-analyses for each. 
Using this approach we were able to address our second aim, which was to determine 
the core regions implicated in ToM reasoning globally and on a more task-specific 
level. Schurz et al. (2014) addressed similar questions in their recent meta-analytic 
study, but here we included a substantially larger number of independent studies (127 
versus 73). A further aim was to use meta-analysis for the first time to identify the 
neural networks associated with broader ToM task parameters. To achieve this, three 
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ALE-contrast analyses were conducted in which we compared areas of brain activation 
for the following pairs: (i) implicit versus explicit ToM tasks, (ii) cognitive versus 
affective ToM tasks, and (iii) visual versus verbal ToM tasks. Our final aim was to use 
MACM for the first time to establish data-driven connectivity models for ROIs 
established for instructional focus, inference type and modality of presentation, and to 
examine how they co-activate with data available in the BrainMap database.  
 
2. Materials and methods 
2.1. Literature selection and exclusion criteria  
We only included studies that specifically investigated ToM (i.e., the ability to 
understand others’ mental states, and to appreciate that these may differ from our own) 
and that were specifically designed by the authors to investigate ToM processes. Studies 
that did not involve a specific ToM component were not included. For example, studies 
that only looked at passive observation of actions, emotional contagion, social 
understanding, mimicry, emotional regulation, imitation, or sympathy were not 
considered ToM studies if they did not have a specific ToM component. In that sense 
our meta-analysis is different from those that have focused on social cognition in 
general (e.g., Van Overwalle et al., 2014), action observation (e.g., Caspers, 2010), 
imitation (e.g., Molenberghs et al., 2009), empathy (Fan et al., 2011), and the mirror 
system (e.g., Molenberghs et al., 2012).    
In addition to ToM review papers (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Carrington & Bailey, 
2009; Frith & Frith, 2012; Lieberman, 2007;  Mar, 2011; Siegal & Varley, 2002) and 
previous ToM meta-analyses (Bzdok et al., 2012; Decety & Lamm, 2007; Schurz et al., 
2014; Van Overwalle, 2009), we searched the Web of Science database 
(http://apps.isiknowledge.com) for ToM fMRI studies using the keywords ‘theory of 
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mind’, ‘ToM’, ‘mentalising’, ‘mentalizing’ and ‘fMRI’. This search revealed more than 
500 studies. The inclusion criteria for our analyses were as follows: 
1. Only empirical studies that used fMRI were included. Those employing other 
techniques, including positron emission tomography (PET), single-photon 
emission tomography (SPECT), magnetoencephalography (MEG), TMS, 
behavioural measures or review articles, were excluded. We restricted our study 
to fMRI data because we wanted to have approximately comparable spatial and 
temporal resolution for the ALE analyses. 
2. Studies were only included if they reported whole-brain activation co-ordinates. 
Studies focusing on a priori ROIs violate a key assumption of ALE meta-
analysis, namely, that the likelihood of activation under the null hypothesis is 
equal across the brain, Eickhoff et al., 2009).  Studies were also required to have 
reported co-ordinates in standardised space (MNI or Talairach) and be the result 
of contrasts that were clearly aimed at identifying ToM processes (i.e., contrasts 
that compared a ToM task to a comparable control).  
3. Only experiments that included non-clinical participants were included to 
eliminate potential differences in brain activation that may be associated with 
neurological or psychiatric illness.  
 
After exclusions based on the above criteria, a total of 127 studies remained (July, 
2014). Only one contrast was permitted to contribute from each study, unless the study 
reported multiple experiments involving different participant groups. This yielded 144 
independent experiments contributing to the analyses. Seven basic types of ToM task 
were identified that occurred frequently in the neuroimaging literature, and their key 
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characteristics are detailed in Supplementary Table 1. Our meta-analyses focused on 
task type contained the following task groups: (i) Stories, including 457 foci from 45 
experiments with 1333 participants, (ii) Cartoons, including 254 foci from 20 
experiments with 374 participants, (iii) Photographs, including 203 foci from 12 
experiments with 254 participants, (iv) Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET), 
including 198 foci from 10 experiments with 181 participants, (v) Videos, including 173 
foci from 15 experiments with 237 participants, (vi) Animations, including 198 foci 
from 11 experiments, with 181 participants, and (vii) Interactive Games, including 160 
foci from 15 experiments with 256 participants.  
 
In total, 144 independent experiments, 1789 activation foci and 3150 participants were 
included in the global ALE meta-analysis. Details of each study are type of analyses 
presented in Supplementary Table 2A-M. As noted, in addition to the basic distinction 
between task type, we also differentiated between ToM tasks on the basis of broader 
task parameters, and specifically, instructional focus, type of mentalising inference, and 
modality of presentation. Tasks that involved presentation of multimodal stimuli did not 
contribute to these analyses. Categorisation of tasks as either implicit or explicit was 
based on whether participants were explicitly asked to attend to others’ mental states. 
Using these criteria, a total of 725 foci from 58 experiments with 1026 participants were 
classified as implicit, and 1024 foci from 84 experiments were classified as explicit. For 
type of mentalising inference, tasks were classified as affective if they required 
participants to infer emotional states, and cognitive if they involved understanding of 
beliefs, intentions or goals. In total, 496 foci from 30 experiments with 578 participants 
were classified as affective, and 1100 foci from 97 experiments with 2251 participants 
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were classified as cognitive. We also differentiated between tasks based on whether 
they involved visual or verbal stimuli. Whereas the former included cartoons, 
photographs and silent videos, the latter included false belief and intentional inference 
stories. In total, 1076 foci from 78 experiments with 1422 participants were classified as 
visual, and 448 foci from 53 experiments with 1011 participants were classified as 
verbal.  
 
2.2. Meta-analytic methods 
2.2.1. Activation Likelihood Estimation Meta-Analysis Approach 
To identify regions of consistent activation, we performed an ALE analysis 
(Eickhoff et al., 2009), using the Ginger ALE software (Eikhoff et al., 2009). We used 
this software to undertake two types of analyses. The first of these was an independent 
data-set analysis, which was used to identify areas of consistent activation across all 
studies, as well as in relation to each of the seven types of ToM task. For these analyses, 
activation foci was initially interpreted as the centre of three-dimensional Gaussian 
probability distributions, such that the spatial uncertainty associated with each 
individual co-ordinate was captured (Eickhoff et al., 2009). In cases where co-ordinates 
were reported in Talairach and Tournoux stereotaxic space (1988), these were converted 
into Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space using the TAL- MNI tool provided in 
Brain Map software, which implements the Lancaster transformation prior to analysis 
(Laird et al., 2010). The three-dimensional probabilities of all activation foci in a given 
experiment were then combined for each voxel, resulting in a modelled activation map 
(MA map; Eickhoff et al., 2009). The union of these maps produces ALE scores that 
describe the convergence of results at each voxel of the brain (Turkeltaub et al., 2012). 
The ALE scores are then compared with an empirically defined null distribution 
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(Eickhoff et al., 2012). A strength of the ALE version used is that rather than testing for 
above-chance clustering of activated foci, it assesses above-chance clustering of 
activated foci between experiments, thus permitting random-effects inference. The 
resulting non-parametric p-values for each meta-analysis were thresholded at a cluster-
forming threshold of p<0.001 and false discovery rate (FDR) of p < 0.05 to identify 
above-chance convergence in each analysis (Eickhoff et al., 2012).  
Contrast and conjunction analyses were performed in Ginger ALE to identify 
similarities and differences in neural activation between: (i) implicit and explicit 
instructional cues, (ii) affective and cognitive mentalising inferences, and (iii) verbal 
and visual modalities. For each of these contrasts, a conjunction image was created 
using the voxel-wise minimum value of the included ALE images to display the 
similarity between the datasets (Eickhoff et al., 2011). In the same analysis two ALE 
contrast images were also created for each of the data-sets to be compared by directly 
subtracting one input image from the other. To correct for sampling error, GingerALE 
creates data by pooling the foci in each data set and randomly dividing them into two 
new groupings equivalent in size to the original datasets. An ALE image is created for 
each new dataset, then subtracted from the other and compared with the true data. 
Permutation calculations are used to compute a voxel-wise p value image that indicates 
where values of the true data fall within the distribution of values in that voxel. To 
simplify interpretation of ALE contrast images, significant ALE subtraction scores were 
converted to Z scores. For contrast analyses, clusters were thresholded at a false 
discovery rate of p < 0.05 and minimum cluster size of 100 mm
3 
(Laird et al., 2005). 
To directly investigate the nature and connectivity of brain regions involved in 
ToM and in relation to each of the three task parameters, meta-analytic connectivity 
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modelling (MACM) was performed using the BrainMap Database (Laird et al., 2011). 
Using this methodology, the co-activation pattern of a given region was investigated 
using seed-based ALE meta-analysis of functional neuroimaging data stored in 
‘neuroimaging’ databases (Langner et al., 2014; Robinson et al., 2010). This method 
reveals functional connectivity across brain regions by identifying areas that are 
consistently co-activated with a specified region of interest (the “seed”) across a broad 
range of experiments. In the present study, the clusters identified as unique to each task 
parameter in the contrast analyses were isolated as regions of interest in MNI space 
using the ALE output images previously obtained in the ALE analyses described above. 
Mango imaging software version 3.2.3 (http://ric.uthscsa.edu/mango/) was used to 
create the ROIs identified from the ALE contrast analyses; two ROIs were identified for 
implicit ToM, two ROIs for explicit ToM, eight ROIs were defined for affective ToM, 
three ROIs for cognitive ToM, three ROIs for visual and seven ROIs for verbal ToM 
sub-components.  
The BrainMap functional database was accessed using the Sleuth application 
(version 2.3.3). At the time that the search was undertaken (July 2014), the database 
contained 2,472 papers which reported 11,869 experiments with 48,740 participants. 
Separate searches were conducted to identify all experiments in the database reporting 
activation in each of the ROIs. Only foci from fMRI studies that included non-clinical 
participants were considered eligible. Experiments resulting from the search were then 
exported as MNI co-ordinates and loaded into the Ginger ALE application. The foci 
resulting from each ROI search were then analysed using ALE meta-analysis to 
determine the convergence of the reported activation foci in these experiments 
(Eickhoff et al., 2012; Turkeltaub et al., 2012). The ALE methodology was identical to 
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that described above for the independent data analyses. An uncorrected threshold of p < 
0.001 was used to define the clusters, and an FDR of p < 0.05 was used to define 
significance. Significant convergence outside the ROI using this analysis indicates 
regions of the brain that are reliably co-activated with the ROI, thus illustrating a co-
activation pattern across the brain for each ROI. 
Areas of co-activation networks were compared across ToM task parameters by 
pooling the data obtained in BrainMap for each region and inputting these into the 
GingerALE program. Three contrast ALE meta-analyses were then performed to 
identify differential and converging co-activation patterns between each pair of ToM 
task parameters. Because all of the studies obtained from the BrainMap database search 
included at least one activation within the ROIs, inevitably the greatest convergence 
would occur within that region (Langner et al., 2014). Because of this, when co-
activation foci were pooled across ROIs for each sub-component, foci within each of 
the ROIs were manually removed from the text file to ensure contrast analyses only 
identified areas of co-activation (i.e., activation outside the seed regions). For co-
activation contrast analyses, clusters were thresholded at a false discovery rate of p < 
0.05 and minimum cluster size of 100 mm
3 
(Laird et al., 2005). Finally, to help with 
interpretation and link the present results with existing connectivity data and network 
structures, the contrast MACM results were overlayed (see Supplementary Figure 9) 
onto the 7-network structure described in Figure 11 in Yeo and colleagues (2011). This 
is a parcellation of the human cerebral cortex based on resting-state functional 
connectivity MRI data from 1,000 subjects.   
 
3. Results 
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3.1. Meta-analysis across all included studies 
The ALE meta-analysis of all 144 included studies revealed seven brain regions 
of convergence. These are shown on a rendered image in Figure 1, and on axial slices in 
Supplementary Figure 1. Corresponding MNI co-ordinates for the clusters are provided 
in Supplementary Table 3. Clusters were located in the mPFC extending into the medial 
orbitofrontal cortex and ACC, the precuneus, bilaterally from the temporal pole into the 
posterior superior temporal gyrus and TPJ, and bilaterally in the IFG.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
 
3.2. Independent analyses of specific ToM tasks 
We next performed individual meta-analyses for each of the seven specific types 
of ToM task.  For each, significant areas of convergence are presented in Figure 2 
and Supplementary Figure 2. MNI co-ordinates are reported in Supplementary Table 
4.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
 The ALE meta-analysis revealed seven significant activation clusters for Stories, 
five for Cartoons, seven for Photographs, eight for RMET, four for Video tasks, ten for 
Animations, and three for Interactive Games. 
 
3.3. Independent analyses across broader ToM task parameters 
In addition to the global analysis of all 144 datasets, and the seven independent 
meta-analyses conducted for each type of ToM task, three further independent ALE 
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analyses were conducted to identify the patterns of brain activation revealed in response 
to the three broader ToM task parameters (instructional focus, type of mentalising 
inference, and modality of presentation). 
 
3.3.1. Explicit versus implicit ToM. 
Focusing first on the distinction between instructional focus, independent ALE 
analyses revealed ten clusters of activation for explicit tasks, and nine areas of 
convergence for implicit ToM tasks. Significant areas of activation for explicit and 
implicit analyses are displayed visually in Figures 3A and 3B, respectively, and detailed 
in Supplementary Figure 3 and Supplementary Table 5. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
Common areas of brain activation were found in response to both explicit and 
implicit tasks in the mPFC, precuneus, bilateral IFG, TPJ and temporal poles.  These 
areas are presented visually in Figure 3C.  A contrast analysis also revealed significant 
differences in brain activation in four areas. Whereas explicit tasks elicited more 
activation in the posterior medial frontal cortex (mFC) and left TPJ, implicit tasks 
elicited significantly greater activation in the dorsal mPFC and right lateral orbitofrontal 
cortex. These areas are presented visually in Figure 3D. 
We next conducted independent MACM analyses for areas identified in the 
contrast analysis. These analyses revealed ten clusters of co-activation for areas 
involved in explicit ToM tasks, and five regions of co-activation for areas involved in 
implicit tasks. Significant clusters for explicit and implicit analyses are displayed in 
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Figures 4A and 4B, respectively, and results for all analyses are displayed in 
Supplementary Figure 4 and Supplementary Table 6. 
 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
 
A conjunction image identified fourteen clusters which represent overlapping 
areas of co-activation with regions associated with both explicit and implicit ToM areas 
(Figure 4C).  Differences in MACM were also identified between explicit and implicit 
instructional cues. Whereas explicit ToM regions co-activated with the mid-cingulate 
gyrus and left inferior parietal lobule, implicit ToM regions co-activated with areas that 
included the posterior mFC and bilateral dorsalateral PFC (Figure 4D and 
Supplementary Figure 9A).  
 
3.3.2. Affective versus cognitive ToM 
Independent ALE analyses revealed eight clusters of activation for affective 
tasks and five areas of convergence for cognitive ToM tasks. Significant areas of 
activation are displayed in Figure 5, and results for all analyses are reported in 
Supplementary Figure 5 and Supplementary Table 7.  
 
[Insert Figure 5 here] 
 
Common areas of brain activation to affective and cognitive tasks were 
identified in the mPFC, bilateral TPJ and anterior part of the middle temporal gyrus 
(Figure 5C). A contrast analysis showed significantly greater activation for affective 
ToM in the posterior mFC, bilateral IFG, middle frontal gyrus, temporal poles and 
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posterior middle temporal gyrus. Cognitive ToM tasks elicited more activation in the 
precuneus, bilateral TPJ and right middle temporal gyrus (Figure 5D).  
Independent MACM analyses were then conducted for areas identified in the 
contrast analysis of affective and cognitive ToM tasks. These revealed nine clusters of 
co-activation for areas associated with affective ToM tasks, and twelve regions of co-
activation for cognitive ToM tasks. Significant clusters for affective and cognitive ToM 
are displayed in Figure 6A and 6B, respectively, and results for all analyses are reported 
in Supplementary Figure 6 and Supplementary Table 8. 
 
                                                      [Insert Figure 6 here] 
 
To establish the degree of similarity in MACM for affective and cognitive tasks, 
a conjunction image was produced. This identified eleven clusters which represent 
overlapping areas of co-activation with regions associated with both affective and 
cognitive ToM brain areas (Figure 6C). In terms of differences in MACM for affective 
and cognitive tasks, affective ToM areas co-activated more with the bilateral IFG, 
fusiform gyrus, precentral gyrus, right anterior and mid-superior temporal gyrus, and 
supplementary motor area (SMA). In contrast, cognitive ToM regions co-activated more 
with bilateral TPJ, precuneus, cuneus, mid-cingulate gyrus, right posterior STS, and left 
globus pallidus (Figure 6D and Supplementary Figure 9B).  
 
 
3.3.3. Verbal versus visual ToM 
Finally, focusing on modality of presentation, independent ALE analyses 
revealed nine activation clusters for verbal tasks, and ten areas of convergence for 
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visual tasks. Significant clusters for both analyses are displayed in Figure 7A and 7B, 
respectively, and results for all analyses are provided in Supplementary Figure 7 and 
Supplementary Table 9. 
 
[Insert Figure 7 here] 
 
Common areas of activation for visual and verbal tasks were found in the mPFC, 
precuneus, bilateral TPJ, IFG and the mid-part of the middle frontal gyrus (Figure 7C). 
 A contrast analysis revealed more activation in response to visual ToM tasks in 
the left precentral gyrus, left IFG and a region at the border between the right IFG and 
right anterior insula. Verbal tasks elicited more activation in the mPFC, precuneus and 
bilateral TPJ (Figure 7D).   
Independent MACM analyses were conducted for areas identified in the contrast 
analysis of visual and verbal ToM. These revealed seven clusters of co-activation for 
areas associated with processing visual ToM tasks, and twelve regions of co-activation 
that activated more in response to verbal tasks. Significant clusters for visual and verbal 
analyses are displayed in Figure 8A and 8B, respectively, and results for all analyses are 
reported in Supplementary Figure 8 and Supplementary Table 10. 
 
[Insert Figure 8 here] 
 
A conjunction image identified nine clusters that represent overlapping areas of 
co-activation with regions associated with both visual and verbal ToM brain areas 
(Figure 8 C).  Differences in MACM for visual and verbal tasks were also identified. 
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Specifically, areas of co-activation associated with verbal ToM regions included the 
mPFC, precuneus, bilateral TPJ, anterior middle temporal gyri, hippocampus and left 
IFG. In contrast, visual ToM regions co-activated with bilateral insula, left cingulate 
gyrus, left supramarginal gyrus, precuneus, right putamen, left cerebellum, fusiform 
gyrus, superior occipital gyrus and bilateral lateral prefrontal cortex (Figure 8D and 
Supplementary Figure 9C).   
 
4. Discussion  
Deficits in reasoning about another’s beliefs, feelings, desires, intentions or 
goals have clear and important consequences for a number of clinical groups, and can 
profoundly limit functional capacity and quality of life (Henry et al., 2016). Across 
normal human development, individual differences in ToM also have important 
implications for social competency. It is therefore unsurprising that a considerable 
literature has been directed at trying to understand when and why this critical social 
cognitive skill is likely to break down. One of the most important ways in which this 
question can be addressed is by identifying the functional brain networks involved in 
ToM. Despite this a considerable literature on the topic, many important questions 
remain with respect to the brain regions implicated in specific types of ToM task, 
broader task parameters, and patterns of co-activation between different brain areas. The 
current meta-analysis addressed these questions by using two different but 
complementary meta-analytic approaches: ALE and MACM. The results not only 
provide an important cross-validation of prior quantitative reviews, but also extend our 
understanding of the functional networks involved in different types of ToM reasoning.   
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Compared with similar meta-analyses in this field, the current meta-analysis is 
different and novel because it: (1) used a whole brain approach (e.g., Van Overwalle 
(2009) performed a region-of-interest (ROI) approach), (2) specifically focused on ToM 
(e.g., Van Overwalle et al. (2014) focused on social cognition in general and Fan et al. 
(2011) focused on empathy), and (3) distinguished between different types of ToM 
tasks and broader ToM parameters (e.g., Bzdok et al., (2012) combined all ToM studies 
into one ALE analysis). Indeed, compared with the most recent neuroimaging ToM 
meta-analysis by Schurz et al. (2014), our meta-analysis is novel in three important 
ways. First, we included almost twice as many experiments (144 versus 73, an increase 
of 97%). Second, our ToM neuroimaging meta-analysis differentiated between broad 
ToM task "parameters" (i.e., visual vs verbal; affective vs cognitive; explicit vs 
implicit), which are amongst the most important theoretical distinctions made in the 
broader ToM literature, and consequently provides important new information for future 
researchers in this field.  Finally, for the first time we used contrast-analyses and meta-
analytic connectivity modelling (MACM), sophisticated meta-analytic approaches that 
provide unique and more nuanced insights into the anatomically and functionally 
distinct neural networks involved in ToM.  
 
4.1. Consistent regions involved in ToM  
Our first aim was to establish which brain areas are consistently engaged in ToM 
by conducting an ALE meta-analysis across all 144 relevant ToM studies. The results of 
these analyses were broadly consistent with a recent quantitative meta-analytic review 
by Schurz and colleagues (2014), which suggested a widespread network of brain 
regions involved in ToM. Specifically, the mentalizing network is typically associated 
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with the anterior dorsal mPFC and bilateral TPJ (Van Overwalle, 2009). Although we 
found these two regions were the most consistently activated across different tasks and 
modalities, other areas were also reliably engaged, including the precuneus, IFG 
(including the pars opercularis, pars triangularis and medial and lateral orbitofrontal 
cortex), precentral gyrus, ACC, temporal pole, posterior dorsal mPFC, ventral mPFC, 
middle temporal gyrus and posterior STS.   
 Thus, although thinking about others’ mental states is typically associated with 
the anterior dorsal mPFC (Amodio & Frith, 2006), the present meta-analysis revealed 
that consistent activation was evident in the posterior mFC, anterior part of the dorsal 
mPFC, ventral mPFC, as well as the medial OFC. The posterior mFC has strong 
connections with premotor, supplementary motor and cingulate motor areas, and has 
been linked with cognitive tasks such as those involved in action monitoring and 
attention (Amodio and Frith, 2006). The role of the dorsal mPFC in ToM is likely to be 
in relation to the more cognitive aspects of the mentalising process, such as when no 
emotional valence has to be associated with a particular action (which typically happens 
in more ventral regions of the mPFC, see e.g., Saxe, 2006). The anterior dorsal mPFC 
was the most consistently activated region across different tasks and in the conjunction 
analyses. Its role in mentalising is thought to support second-order representations, 
which can either be of the mental state of another person or a non-social event (Frith, 
2007; Baetens et al., 2013). The mPFC is therefore not necessarily specific for social 
cognition, but its role is essential in some aspects of the mentalising process. The more 
ventral parts of the mPFC have typically been associated with self-referential processing 
(Northoff et al., 2006; D’Argembeau et al., 2007; Van Overwalle, 2009). The role of the 
ventral mPFC in the mentalising process is believed to be associated with accessing 
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personal knowledge and simulating what one would do in a similar situation as the 
observed person. Finally, the medial parts of the OFC have been linked with associating 
an outcome with reward, whereas the more lateral parts of the OFC are associated with 
evaluating punishers, which may lead to a change in ongoing behavior (Kringelbach and 
Rolls, 2004; Berridge and Kringelbach 2013; Molenberghs et al., 2014). The role of the 
OFC in the mentalising process might therefore involve linking an emotional valence to 
a particular person, their actions or their thoughts.   
The TPJ is often involved in lower-level processes associated with the sense of 
agency and reorienting attention to salient stimuli, as well as during higher-level 
cognitive processing tasks, including ToM (Decety & Lamm, 2007).  Previous reviews 
have suggested that the right TPJ in particular may be involved when making belief 
inferences about others (e.g., Saxe & Wexler, 2005), but the current data suggest that 
the left TPJ is also consistently activated. The role of the TPJ in mentalising is believed 
to be similar to the role of the anterior dorsal mPFC in inferring mental states of others 
such as goals and intentions. There is evidence, however, that the TPJ is more 
commonly activated when people attribute temporary states to others, whereas the 
mPFC is more involved in the attribution of enduring trait-like characteristics (Van 
Overwalle, 2009). The adjacent posterior STS was also consistently activated during 
ToM tasks. This region is often activated when observing biological (or implied) 
motion of the eyes, mouth, hand and body, especially when they are socially relevant 
(Allison et al., 2000). Although not specific for mentalising per se, this region seems to 
be crucial for decoding and interpreting social signals from observed biological motion.  
The precuneus is often activated during visuo-spatial imagery, autobiographical  
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memory and episodic memory retrieval, and together with the mPFC is considered to be 
a crucial part of the default mode network (Cavanna & Trimble , 2006;  Spreng, & 
Grady, 2010). Again, although the precuneus is not solely involved in mentalising, 
given its crucial role in retrieving previous experiences and imagery it is not suprising 
that this region was consistently activated. The temporal pole was also consistently 
activated during ToM processing. This region typically binds complex, highly 
processed perceptual inputs to visceral emotional responses (Olson et al., 2007), and is 
believed to play a role in mentalizing together with the mPFC through the storage and 
recollection of so-called “social scripts”, which represent specific knowledge about the 
world and people (e.g., what they look like, where they live, whether they can be 
trusted, etc.). It is believed that this knowledge is stored in the temporal pole and mPFC 
and is used when making inferences about others (Frith, 2007; Van Overwalle, 2009). 
Trait inferences about unfamiliar others often involves the dorsal mPFC while the 
ventral mPFC is often involved when making inferences about familiar others or the self 
(Northoff, 2006; Van Overwalle, 2009).  
 Some of the areas that were consistently activated, including the posterior IFG 
and adjacent precentral gyrus, overlap with areas commonly associated with the mirror 
system, as revealed in a recent meta-analysis of relevant studies (Molenberghs et al., 
2012). According to one influential account, we understand the emotions and actions of 
others by engaging the same neural circuits as those recruited when we ourselves feel 
emotions of plan actions (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010). This is in line with recent 
theories which have proposed that ToM capacity derives from an integration of mirror 
and mentalising systems (Keysers & Gazzola, 2007). The particular contributions and 
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possible interactions between these two networks is discussed in the next section when 
considering their engagement across specific tasks and components of ToM.  
 
4.2. Different ToM tasks 
We conducted separate ALE meta-analyses for each of the seven distinct types 
of ToM task (Stories, Cartoons, Photographs, RMET, Videos, Animations and 
Interactive Games). In line with Schurz et al. 2014, the results pointed to important 
similarities but also systematic differences in the patterns of neural activation across 
different tasks.  
Studies of ToM that used the RMET, Photographs, Videos and Animation tasks 
(but not Stories, Cartoons or Interactive Games) activated areas of the posterior IFG and 
adjacent premotor cortex. Perhaps identification of the observed actions or emotional 
expressions displayed in each task imposed demands on a simulation mechanism 
(Keysers & Gazzola, 2009; Molenberghs et al., 2012). The RMET and Photographs 
often include emotional expressions of faces, and Videos and Animations often involve 
visual presentations of dynamic hand, body and facial expressions; this is rarely the case 
for Stories, Cartoons or Interactive Games. From a simulation perspective, it is 
suggested that rather than reasoning about others’ internal states, individuals can 
simulate the actions and emotions of others by recruiting similar neural networks to 
those when we experience emotions and intentions ourselves (Iacobini, 2009; Keysers 
& Gazzola, 2009; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010). The RMET, Photographs, Videos and 
Animation tasks, however, also revealed activation in areas of the mentalising system, 
including the mPFC and TPJ. This suggests that successful attribution of mental states 
when undertaking these tasks may also involve additional cognitive processes beyond 
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mere simulation (Saxe, 2005; Lieberman, 2007; Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009), 
although mere localization does not necessarily imply specific cognitive functions 
(Poldrack, 2006).   
In contrast, ToM Stories activated areas associated solely with the mentalising 
system (i.e., mPFC, TPJ, precuneus), suggesting that stories may impose particularly 
strong demands on cognitive theorising about the mental states of others (Van 
Overwalle, 2009). This seems plausible considering the absence of contextual visual 
cues, such as facial expression and motor movements, available to assist with 
mentalising inferences. ToM Stories also reliably activated areas of the temporal pole 
and middle temporal gyrus. Given the semantic information present in these stories, this 
finding is in line with evidence that such temporal areas play a critical role in storing 
and accessing semantic knowledge (e.g., Patterson et al., 2007). 
  
4.3. Sub-components of ToM 
A particularly novel feature of the present meta-analysis was the use of ALE 
contrast analyses to identify neural networks associated with broader ToM task 
parameters. In total, three ALE contrast analyses were conducted to investigate 
overlapping and distinct ToM networks underlying: (i) instructional focus (implicit 
versus explicit), (ii) inference type (cognitive versus affective) and (iii) modality of 
presentation (visual versus verbal). These analyses identified two main findings. First, 
the mPFC and bilateral TPJ were activated across each ToM parameter, in line with 
predictions and recent studies suggesting that these areas are most consistently involved 
in ToM reasoning (Van Overwalle, 2009; Schurz et al., 2014). Second, several brain 
areas specific to each ToM parameter were identified, as detailed below. 
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4.3.1. Instructional focus: implicit and explicit ToM 
A topic of considerable controversy in the ToM literature is whether implicit and 
explicit mentalising impose demands on shared or distinct neural networks (Lieberman, 
2007; Van Overwalle & Vandekerckhove, 2013). The contrast analyses provide a 
preliminary answer this question: implicit and explicit ToM processing overlap 
considerably in the neural networks they engage, with the anterior dorsal mPFC, 
precuneus, bilateral IFG, TPJ and temporal poles reliably activated by both. This 
finding also supports Van Overwalle & Vandekerckhove’s (2013) argument that these 
two facets of ToM are likely to be processed by the same neural network. 
Potentially important differences also emerged. In particular, implicit tasks 
imposed greater demands on the right OFC. This finding aligns with other evidence 
suggesting that the OFC facilitates automatic aspects of social cognition (Lieberman, 
2007). It has been argued that this is possible due to its strong input connections from 
several sensory and visceral areas of the brain, and output connections to limbic areas 
such as the amygdala, hippocampus, cingulate gyrus and thalamus (Kringelbach and 
Rolls, 2004). Together, these connections make the OFC ideally placed for multi-modal 
implicit stimulus-reinforcement learning. In contrast, explicit tasks elicited greater 
activation in the TPJ, a region that is typically associated with explicitly representing 
the contexts of others beliefs (Saxe, 2006). False beliefs are prototypical examples of 
such reflective and explicit mentalising, and commonly activate this area (Amodio & 
Frith, 2006).  
The MACM analysis further revealed that a large proportion of the connectivity 
patterns for the areas differentially activated in the contrast ALE analysis for implicit 
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versus explicit tasks overlapped with each other. These areas, which include the 
posterior mFC and bilateral premotor cortex, are typically associated with motor 
preparation and conflict monitoring. There were also some slight differences with the 
explicit ToM regions in the MACM  contrast analysis (Figure 4D), overlapping with 
networks identified in Yeo et al., (2011) as being involved in ventral and dorsal 
attention, while the implicit ToM regions overlapped with the frontoparietal network 
(Supplementary Figure 9A). 
 
4.3.2. Inference type: affective and cognitive ToM  
Affective ToM is slightly different from what is typically referred to as 
cognitive empathy (Shamay-Tsoory, 2011), cognitive-evaluative form of empathy (Fan 
et al., 2012) or emotion understanding (Decety, 2011). Although many authors use the 
terms interchangeably, Decety (2011) refers to cognitive empathy as a combination of 
emotion awareness and understanding. Decety (2011) argues that the neural 
mechanisms of emotional understanding draw on regions typically associated with 
theory of mind-like processing such as the vmPFC and mPFC, whereas emotional 
awareness (which is not typically associated with ToM) is instantiated in the anterior 
insula (which integrates homeostatic conditions with the sensory environment).  
Both affective and cognitive ToM processing resulted in consistent activation in 
anterior dorsal mPFC and bilateral TPJ. However, the results also revealed some 
potentially important differences, such as greater activation for affective ToM in a range 
of areas including the left OFC, bilateral pars opercularis and adjacent ventral premotor 
cortex. These results are in line with other work showing that the OFC plays a 
particularly critical role in affective processing (Berridge and Kringelbach 2013). In 
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addition, the activation of pars opercularis and adjacent premotor cortex suggests 
affective relative to cognitive ToM processing may impose greater demands on the 
capacity for simulation (Keysers & Gazzola, 2009). This is not surprising given that 
affective ToM tasks often involve stimuli that show pictures or videos of people without 
much context, where participants are forced to rely on people’s emotional expressions. 
Even more abstract affective ToM tasks, such as emotional stories, likely result in an 
automatic emotional visceral reaction in the observer, whereas more cognitive ToM 
tasks often involved complex abstract reasoning. This is supported by the fact that 
cognitive ToM tasks elicited more activation in the precuneus, right TPJ and middle 
areas of the superior temporal gyrus, areas that have been linked to more abstract mental 
state representations, including beliefs, goals and intentions (Van Overwalle & Baetens, 
2009).    
The MACM analysis revealed stronger differential connectivity in affective 
versus cognitive ToM processing, similar to that seen for implicit versus explicit ToM 
processing. This is in line with the view, mentioned above, that affective tasks often 
involve implicit processes whereas more cognitive tasks rely on explicit processing. The 
areas more consistently activated by affective ToM tasks showed stronger connectivity 
with bilateral OFC, insula, posterior inferior frontal gyrus, premotor cortex and fusiform 
gyrus. The OFC and insula are often involved in associating positive and negative 
feelings with salient external stimuli (Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004; Menon & Uddin, 
2010). The posterior IFG and premotor cortex have been implicated in simulation 
processes (Molenberghs et al., 2012) and the fusiform gyrus is often involved in face 
processing (Kanwisher & Yovel, 2006) but also body perception more generally 
(Peelen, & Downing, 2005). These regions overlapped with networks involved in the 
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limbic and dorsal attention network (Supplementary Figure 9B) as identified by Yeo 
and colleagues (2011).  
Increased connectivity for cognitive ToM tasks was associated with areas more 
typically associated with the mentalising process, such as the bilateral TPJ and 
precuneus. These regions overlapped with the default, ventral attention and 
frontoparietal networks (Supplementary Figure 9B). These connectivity patterns suggest 
that affective ToM tasks rely on a broader network than the one typically associated 
with ‘cold’ or more cognitive aspects of mentalising. These findings imply that affective 
ToM (relative to cognitive ToM) might be more sensitive to pathological insult, because 
it relies on a broader, more distributed neural network. 
 
4.3.2. Modality of presentation: visual and verbal ToM  
We also compared visual and verbal modalities of presentation in ToM tasks. 
We found that both types of ToM processing are associated with consistent activation in 
anterior dorsal mPFC, bilateral TPJ, precuneus, temporal pole and bilateral IFG. 
However, again, important differences emerged. For example, visual tasks produced 
greater activation in the right anterior insula, left precentral gyrus and pars opercularis. 
These results suggest that visual ToM tasks elicit more activation in brain areas 
typically associated with simulating observed actions. Beyond the typical hand actions 
used in mirror system studies, simulation has also been found in response to emotional 
facial expressions in regions including the insula, pars opercularis and ventral premotor 
cortex, suggesting that simulation mechanisms also play a role in understanding the 
emotions of others (Keysers and Gazzola, 2009; Molenberghs et al., 2012). For 
example, in their pioneering study Wicker and colleagues (2003) showed that when we 
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see others express a basic emotion such as disgust, the same brain area (i.e., anterior 
insula) is activated as when we experience the emotion ourselves.  It should be noted 
that the degree of overlap between observed and experienced emotions is a matter of 
intense debate (e.g., Decety, 2010), but one interpretation of the current data is that by 
providing more emotionally salient information, such as facial expressions, visual tasks 
elicit a shared emotional response in individuals that can guide mental state reasoning 
(Bodden et al., 2013).  
In the absence of visual cues, verbal ToM tasks may be less likely to engage 
these processes. Increased activation in verbal tasks was seen in cognitive ToM areas 
such as the anterior dorsal mPFC, precuneus, bilateral TPJ and mid-temporal gyrus. 
These areas are often cited by cognitive theories which emphasise the role of an 
individual’s reflection and higher-order control processes when engaging in mental state 
reasoning (Saxe, 2005, 2006). These areas therefore may reflect more complex aspects 
of ToM reasoning, such as predicting a characters’ behaviour on the basis of more 
abstract information. 
The MACM contrast analyses further corroborated the ALE contrast results. 
Verbal ToM processing showed significantly increased connectivity in areas typically 
associated with the cognitive aspects of mentalising, such as the anterior dorsal mPFC, 
precuneus and bilateral TPJ. These areas overlapped with the default mode network 
(Supplementary Figure 9C) as identified by Yeo and colleagues (2011). Visual ToM 
processing, on the other hand, showed increased connectivity with more simulation 
based areas, such as the rostral inferior parietal lobule, posterior inferior frontal gyrus 
and premotor cortex. These areas overlapped with the dorsal and ventral attention and 
frontoparietal network (Supplementary Figure 9C). Taken together, these data provide 
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the clearest evidence to date that, as for implicit versus explicit ToM, and affective 
versus cognitive ToM, verbal and visual ToM rely on at least partially distinct 
networks. As outlined below, however, these findings need to be interpreted in the 
context of several important methodological limitations.  
Differences in MACM for visual and verbal tasks were also identified. 
Specifically, areas of co-activation associated with verbal ToM regions included the 
mPFC, precuneus, bilateral TPJ, anterior middle temporal gyri, hippocampus and left 
IFG. In contrast, visual ToM regions co-activated with bilateral insula, left cingulate 
gyrus, left supramarginal gyrus, precuneus, right putamen, left cerebellum, fusiform 
gyrus, superior occipital gyrus and bilateral lateral prefrontal cortex (Figure 8D and 
Supplementary Figure 9C).   
 
4.4. Limitations and Future Directions 
The quantitative meta-analytic techniques used in the current study extend 
current understanding of the neural basis of ToM.  Objectively analysing results across 
a large number of fMRI studies increases statistical power, and thus sensitivity to 
identify areas of the brain that are reliably engaged during ToM processing. By 
weighting the contribution of each study for sample size, we minimised sampling error, 
one of the most serious potential problems known to affect empirical research studies.  
A disadvantage of the pooled approach to meta-analysis, however, is the 
potentially unacceptable level of variability introduced by collapsing across tasks that 
may operationalise ToM quite differently. As discussed above, a wide range of tasks 
have been developed to assess this complex, multifaceted construct. By collapsing 
across multiple definitions, it should be possible, at least in principle, to eliminate the 
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problem of method variance and identify the most consistent regions across studies. 
However, relying solely on the results of a pooled analysis can obscure potentially 
important differences between different types of task, as well as broader task 
parameters. To address this variability, following on from the sophisticated approach 
used by Schurz et al. (2014), distinct ToM task categories were identified, and analysed 
separately. Using this approach allowed us to gain a more nuanced understanding of the 
neural substrates implicated in different types of ToM reasoning. However, because this 
approach required splitting the total sample into seven groups, power for each specific 
task grouping was necessarily lower. This reduction in statistical power for the seven 
individual task analyses may explain why we found that the mPFC and TPJ were 
consistently engaged across all broad ToM task parameters, but not for each specific 
task group. 
Additionally, limitations in the ALE software need to be acknowledged. 
Currently, ALE software only allows for statistical differences and similarities in brain 
activation to be compared across two task groups. Therefore, caution is needed when 
interpreting the differences in brain activation identified across the seven task type 
meta-analyses, as it was not possible to address whether these differences were 
statistically significant.  
Another important limitation is that the absolute and relative distributions are 
not equal for all tasks and broader task parameters (as would be expected when 
performing a meta-analysis of this sort). For example, the sample contained more 
cognitive (n = 97) than affective (n = 30) experiments. This might have influenced the 
relative power to reveal effects in the independent ALE analyses, since the cognitive 
ALE analysis would have had more power than the affective one. For clarity and 
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completeness of reporting, we provide a detailed overview of the distributions and their 
statistical comparisons per broad parameter and tasks in Supplementary Tables 11-23. 
Some of the relative distributions also differed between the broader task 
parameters (see Supplementary Table 24). There were relatively more verbal studies in 
the cognitive category than in the affective category (44% vs. 17%) and relatively more 
explicit studies in the verbal category than in the visual category (75% vs. 50%). This 
may have affected the contrast analyses. The difference between the cognitive and 
affective modalities might be partially caused by the fact that the cognitive modality 
included a higher relative proportion of verbal tasks. Similarly, the difference between 
the verbal and visual modalities might be partially caused by the fact that the verbal 
modality included a higher relative proportion of explicit tasks. For example, increased 
TPJ, right middle temporal gyrus and precuneus activation was detected both for 
cognitive (compared to affective) and for verbal (compared to visual) tasks. Similarly, 
increased left TPJ activation was detected both for explicit (compared to implicit) and 
for verbal (compared to visual) tasks. It remains unclear whether such differences were 
attributable to the cognitive versus verbal or explicit versus verbal components of the 
studies that were contrasted. It is therefore important that future fMRI investigations 
that are interested in comparing ToM tasks on specific task parameters (for instance, 
visual versus verbal ToM),  ensure that the tasks are closely matched on other key 
parameters (e.g., affective vs cognitive and implicit vs explicit). 
Finally, an important and novel aspect of the present study was the use of 
MACM. Because MACM provides an efficient way of identifying patterns of co-
activation across the brain, use of this meta-analytic approach substantially enhanced 
the quality and depth of the conclusions we were able to reach. Nevertheless, it needs to 
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be acknowledged that the validity of any inferences that can be drawn from MACM 
analyses is intrinsically linked to the quality of the data retrieved from the BrainMap 
database. While BrainMap is a valuable tool for neuroimaging research, it is not an 
exhaustive sample of the literature. Consequently, different categories of studies (e.g., 
visual perception, attention, language, social cognition) may be differentially 
represented, potentially leading to bias.  
 
4.4. Summary 
We believe our study provides the clearest picture to date of the neural correlates 
of ToM, resolving prior inconsistencies identified across individual studies. The present 
meta-analysis also represents an important extension of prior meta-analytic treatments 
of this literature; we included a substantially larger number of studies, investigated the 
influence of three broad task parameters, and employed MACM to explore patterns of 
connectivity across the brain. 
We identified a core ToM network that includes the anterior dorsal mPFC and 
bilateral TPJ. This network was activated regardless of task demands. This is an 
important finding because it indicates that across multiple operational definitions of the 
ToM construct, the same neural regions are implicated. The results also pointed to 
important differences, however, both between specific ToM tasks, as well as broader 
task parameters. Those components of ToM which rely on more affective, visual, or 
implicit stimuli impose additional demands on brain areas typically associated with the 
mirror system, whereas more cognitive, verbal or explicit stimuli rely uniquely on 
mentalising brain areas such as the dorsal mPFC and TPJ.  
39 
 
Our findings could also be informative from a neuropsychological perspective. 
As ToM deficits are common in a range of neurological and psychiatric disorders, a 
deeper understanding of the brain regions subserving this network, and how they 
contribute to and interact during specific mentalising tasks, could improve diagnosis 
and management of these conditions.  
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1. Overview of all significant clusters (FDR, p < .05) in the ALE analysis 
(superimposed on a template using MRIcron) of the 144 fMRI studies in which a 
measure of ToM was administered.  
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Figure 2. Overview of all significant clusters (FDR, p < .05) in the ALE analysis 
(superimposed on a template using MRIcron) for the seven different ToM tasks 
identified. 
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Figure 3. ALE analysis on the role of instructional cues. (A) independent analysis of 
explicit ToM tasks, (B) independent analysis of implicit ToM tasks, (C) conjunction 
analysis of implicit and explicit ToM tasks and (D) contrast analysis of implicit minus 
explicit (blue) and explicit minus implicit (red) ToM tasks. Significant meta-analysis 
results were rendered in MRIcron and displayed on left and right hemisphere and 
medial cut. All clusters were significant at a cluster-forming threshold of p < 0.001 and 
FDR of p < 0.05.  
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Figure 4. MACM analysis on the role of instructional cues. (A) independent MACM 
analysis of implicit ToM tasks, (B) independent MACM analysis of explicit ToM tasks, 
(C) conjunction MACM analysis of implicit and explicit ToM tasks and (D) contrast 
MACM analysis of implicit minus explicit (blue) and explicit minus implicit (red) ToM 
tasks. Significant meta-analysis results were rendered in MRIcron and displayed on left 
and right hemisphere and medial cut. All clusters were significant at a cluster-forming 
threshold of p < 0.001 and FDR of p < 0.05. 
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Figure 5. ALE analysis on the role of different types of mentalising inference. (A) 
independent analysis of affective ToM tasks, (B) independent analysis of cognitive 
ToM tasks, (C) conjunction analysis of affective and cognitive ToM tasks and (D) 
contrast analysis of affective minus cognitive (red) and cognitive minus affective (blue) 
ToM tasks. Significant meta-analysis results were rendered in MRIcron and displayed 
on left and right hemisphere and medial cut. All clusters were significant at a cluster-
forming threshold of p < 0.001 and FDR of p < 0.05. 
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Figure 6. MACM analysis on the role of different types of mentalising inference. (A) 
independent MACM analysis of affective ToM tasks, (B) independent MACM analysis 
of cognitive ToM tasks, (C) conjunction MACM analysis of affective and cognitive 
ToM tasks and (D) contrast MACM analysis of affective minus cognitive (red) and 
cognitive minus affective (blue) ToM tasks. Significant meta-analysis results were 
rendered in MRIcron and displayed on left and right hemisphere and medial cut. All 
clusters were significant at a cluster-forming threshold of p < 0.001 and FDR of p < 
0.05. 
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Figure 7. ALE analysis on the role of stimulus modality. (A) independent analysis of 
verbal ToM tasks, (B) independent analysis of visual ToM tasks, (C) conjunction 
analysis of visual and verbal ToM tasks and (D) contrast analysis of visual and verbal 
ToM tasks. Significant meta-analysis results were rendered in MRIcron and displayed 
on left and right hemisphere and medial cut. All clusters were significant at a cluster-
forming threshold of p < 0.001 and FDR of p < 0.05. 
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Figure 8. MACM analysis on the role of stimulus modality. (A) independent MACM 
analysis of verbal ToM tasks, (B) independent MACM analysis of visual ToM tasks, 
(C) conjunction MACM analysis of visual and verbal ToM tasks and (D) contrast 
MACM analysis of visual and verbal ToM tasks. Significant meta-analysis results were 
rendered in MRIcron and displayed on left and right hemisphere and medial cut. All 
clusters were significant at a cluster-forming threshold of p < 0.001 and FDR of p < 
0.05. 
 
